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1. Introduction: the “nosedive” of labour law? 
Nosedive, the first episode of the third season of the British series Black Mirror, 
released worldwide on Netflix in October 2016, depicts a dystopian reality where 
everyone can give a score to anybody else through a five-star system implemented on 
their smartphones, displaying everyone’s name and current rating. As personal rating 
determines social status and access to jobs and housing, Lacie spends her day handling 
frenetically her smartphone trying to improve her rating, until she goes through a sudden 
and unexpected rating decrease. Such “nosedive” will drive her to madness while the 
spectator falls as well into an increasing anxiety towards a sinister and yet believable 
reality.  
Lightening the risks of reputational systems, Nosedive makes a fine and yet clear 
reference to Uber’s five-star rating system, one of the core points of the organisational 
schemes of the famous American Platform. Reputational systems constitute a leitmotiv of 
most of the platforms that provide services able to fall within the notion of “digital work”, 
as including “crowdwork” and “work on demand via apps”, the two main categories that 
have been identified in literature as part of a unitary phenomenon, calling for a unitary 
approach1.  
                                                          
* Ph.D. Candidate in Labour Law, State University of Milan. References to Italian courts’ decisions and 
scientific reviews follow the editing criteria adopted by the Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro. 
1 V. DE STEFANO, The Rise of the "Just-in-Time Workforce": On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor 
Protection in the "Gig Economy, in Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, 2016, vol. 37, n. 3, p. 474; 
E. DAGNINO, Il lavoro nella on-demand economy: esigenze di tutela e prospettive regolatorie, in Labour 
Law Issues, 2015, 2, 90, who observes that the main difference is that the former involves an “on-demand 
virtual workforce” while the latter involves an “on-demand mobile workforce”. In the perspective of a 
unitary approach also J. PRASSL & M. RISAK, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers? 
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Exactly one week later after the release of Nosedive, a London Employment Judge 
issued the first European decision on the status of Uber drivers2, ruling that the 
relationships between the platform and the drivers are subject to statutory employment 
law provisions on minimum wage and paid leave. There is of course no direct linking 
between the episode and the judgement, even if the latter emphasised inter alia Uber’s 
rating system3. The episode, however, witnesses quite precisely that “digitalisation” is 
not just the breakout of new organisational and productive schemes. It interferes with the 
very essence of human life, reshaping the invisible borders between work time and free 
time, work place and home, and whoever gets work mails on his smartphone may confirm. 
The challenge4, in this perspective, is to avoid technological (r)evolution from 
bringing also labour standards to a “nosedive”, allowing the rise of unregulated legal 
schemes able to bypass statutory employment law by introducing elements of rupture 
with the traditional notion of employee. “Digitalisation”, in its tending towards a 
dangerous commodification of labour5, is a challenge that requires action on different 
frontlines. There are several differences among the platforms offering “digital work” 
services6 and even Employment Judge Snelson admitted that Uber “could have devised a 
business model not involving [it] employing drivers”7. The global phaenomenon we are 
facing has also to pass through the lenses of different legal systems, characterised by 
relevant differences with concern to the criteria employment judges use to qualify the 
relationship.  
Thus, if one part of the challenge is to return – where possible – to the domain of 
statutory employment law those relationships that are actually misclassified under 
applicable legislation, it seems necessary to follow also a complementary path, especially 
in those jurisdictions where judicial reclassification would be difficult to reach. This 
happens to be the case of Italy, where first instance judges tend to give extreme 
importance to the circumstance that the worker is not technically bound to perform his 
tasks, supported by the Supreme’s Court enduring statement that “any human activity can 
be performed under the scheme of an employment relationship or under the scheme of 
self-employed work”8 . It seems necessary, therefore, to make further reflections on the 
development – both at an interpretative and at a policy making level – of protective 
                                                          
Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, in Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, vol. 37, n. 3, 
p. 619, who however use the term “crowdwork” for both the aforementioned types of work. 
2 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al. (London Employment Tribunal 28 October 2016). 
3 Ivi, p. 29, n. 8. 
4 M. WEISS, Digitalizzazione: sfide e prospettive per il diritto del lavoro, in DRI, 2016, n. 3, p. 662. 
5 B. BERGVALL‐KÅREBORN & D. HOWCROFT, Amazon Mechanical Turk and the Commodification of 
Labour, in New Technology, Work and Employment, 2014, vol. 29, n. 3, p. 213; A. ALOISI, Commoditized 
Workers: Case Study Research on Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” 
Platforms, in Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, 2016, vol. 37, n. 3, p. 653. 
6 ALOISI, Commoditized Workers, cit., p. 688, where the A. indicates four key variables that may differ 
from platform to platform (means of exchange, system of payment, population of the users and workers’ 
status). 
7 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 97. 
8 Among the most recent, Cass. 8 November 2016, n. 22658; 3 October 2016, n. 19701; 19 September 2016, 
n. 18320, all in De Jure. 
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schemes applicable to all human beings that work, regardless of the legal scheme 
(employment, self-employment or other) under which they carry out their activities9. 
In this perspective, the paper aims to verify whether it is useful and possible to 
search for some protective provisions applicable to digital workers outside the field of 
statutory employment law.  
To this end, the first part of the paper will deal with the problem of the 
qualification under Italian law of the relationships involving the worker, the user and the 
platform, and will conclude that many platforms may successfully claim the self-
employed status of their workers. Even the existence of intermediation relationships 
seems convincing, although the platform does not carry only intermediary’s obligations.  
The second part will analyse the consequences of such reconstruction under Italian 
law, with particular reference to some critical points (such as the possibility to to 
“dismiss” an Uber driver because of his low reputational rates or to refuse Turkers’ work 
without payment). The paper will try to give an answer to those open questions through 
the application of general contract law, self-employed work rules and B2b regulations, 
with an eye to two recent Italian legislative proposals, in order to verify whether some 
protection can be found outside the domain of statutory employment law, and, in the 
affirmative, to what extent.  
2. Qualification Issues: employees, quasi-subordinate workers or self-employed 
workers? 
The qualification of the relationship as an employment or self-employment one 
represents a crucial standpoint in almost every jurisdiction10. Employees generally enjoy 
several statutory provisions (on wages, working time, and social security benefits) that 
independent contractors do not, on the ground of their supposed higher bargaining power 
and economic independence. 
It is quite difficult to qualify digital workers univocally either as employees or as 
independent contractors, as they find themselves in some sort of grey area11. The platform 
operates at the same time as a broker matching labour supply and demand, as a provider 
of services and goods and as an employer establishing the most important rules governing 
the transaction12, including its termination, which may consist in the deactivation of the 
worker’s account13.  
                                                          
9 P. TULLINI, C’è lavoro sul web?, in Labour Law Issues, 2015, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 9. 
10 A. PERULLI, Economically dependent / quasi-subordinate (parasubordinate) employment: legal, social 
and economic aspects, European Commission 2003, p. 6. 
11 With reference to crowdwork, A. FELSTINER, Working the Crowd. Employment and Labor Law in the 
Crowdsourcing Industry, in Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labour Law, 2011, 32:1, p. 168, who 
points out as platforms deliberately decided to take advantage of the fact that “there were virtually no cases, 
and few indications in the legal literature as to how courts might approach regulation of the ‘cyberspace 
workplace’”. 
12 TULLINI, C’è lavoro sul web?, cit., p. 8. 
13 In a dubitative way, ALOISI Commoditized workers, cit., p. 674. 
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As one of the first decisions from the U.S. litigation on platform drivers14 pointed 
out very clearly, “Lyft drivers don’t’s seem much like employees […] but Lyft drivers 
don’t seem much like independent contractors either”. “A reasonable jury could conclude 
that the plaintiff Lyft drivers were employees. But […] a reasonable jury could also 
conclude that they were independent contractors”15.  
In the US, the difficulties in reaching a clear consensus on the legal status of digital 
workers brought to significant litigation16, which appeared to undermine the 
entrepreneurial model adopted by the “work on demand via app” platforms17. 
Notwithstanding the worldwide debate it gave raise to, as many platforms accepted to 
negotiate a settlement18 (or even unilaterally acknowledged the employee status of their 
workers19), the question is still open. 
The recent judgement issued by London’s Employment Tribunal on 28 October 
201620 took a clear position stating the applicability of the statutory rights related to 
minimum wage and paid leave to Uber drivers working in the London area, individuating 
a series of circumstances pointing to the existence of an employment relationship21. The 
anti-formalistic approach of the British judge in the case reflects the efforts of that 
literature who suggested to determine the scope of statutory employment law adopting a 
functional approach to the concept of Employer, instead of recurring to the “received” 
notions of employee,22, even with particular reference to the case of platform work23. 
2.1. Are digital workers employees under Italian law? 
In Italy, gig-economy-related litigation raised first on competition law issues24, 
with licensed taxi drivers successfully preventing Uber from relasing the Uber-pop 
                                                          
14 Cotter et al. vs. Lyft Inc., Case No. 13-cv-04065-VC, Order denying cross-motions for summary 
judgement (California Northern District Court 11 March 2015). 
15 Ivi, p. 13. The judge consequently denied issuing a summary judgement, referring the case to a jury. 
16 M. CHERRY, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, in Comparative Labour 
Law & Policy Journal, 2016, vol. 37, n. 3, p. 577, providing an in-depth analysis of U.S. litigation. 
17 S. KESSLER, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being Sued To Death, in fastcompany.com, 17 
February 2015; C. DEAMICIS, Homejoy Shuts Down After Battling Worker Classification Lawsuits, in 
recode.net, 17 July 2015.  
18 As in the aforementioned Cotter v. Lyft case, settled on 27 January 2016 for 12 million dollars, and in 
O’Connor et al. v. Uber Technologies Inc. et al., settled on 21 April 2016 for almost 100 million dollars. 
CHERRY, Beyond misclassification, cit., notes that “the result is ultimately disappointing for those who saw 
this as a case that would most likely set a precedent”. 
19 It is the case of the shopping on-demand platform Instacart. D. ALBA, Instacart Shoppers Can Now 
Choose to be Real Employes, in wired.com, 22 June 2015, reports the CEO’s words, explaining that the 
company wanted “to provide supervision and training, which can only be done with employees”.  
20 Supra, n. 2. 
21 The judgement reports (p. 29) thirteen circumstances, from “the fact that Uber interviews and recruits 
drivers” to “the fact that Uber subjects drivers through the rating system” and “reserves the power to amend 
the drivers’ terms unilaterally”.  
22 PRASSL, The Concept of Employer, cit., p. 34, who focuses on the five main functions of the employer. 
23 PRASSL & RISAK, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co., cit., p. 636, where the functional method is applied to two 
platforms: Uber, who emerges as a “sole employer” and Taskrabbit, where the main functions are shared 
between the platform and the users. 
24 N. RAMPAZZO, Rifkin e Uber. Dall'età dell'accesso all'economia dell'eccesso, in Diritto dell'informazione 
e dell'Informatica, 2015, II, 6, p. 957. 
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service, which would have allowed (unlicensed) private citizens to provide transportation 
services25. The Italian gig-economy faced its first defy from the labour side just in October 
2016, when Foodora drivers took collective action in reply to the decision of the Company 
to change their payment scheme from a 5,60 Euros per hour to a 3 Euros per delivery26. 
The mobilisation of Foodora drivers brought the problem of digital labour at the centre 
of the debate, gaining also the cover of the prestigious weekly Internazionale27, and 
required the intervention of the Labour Department, after which the company increased 
to four Euros the delivery fee28. 
Even though in Italy the ascertainment of the employment status follows a path 
which is similar to the several tests developed in Common Law systems, as it focuses on 
the degree of control that the employer exercises on the execution of the performance29, 
to seek the re-classification of many digital workers as employees under Italian law could 
be somewhat “gasping”30.  
While common law jurisdictions developed a series of different “tests” to 
determine the application of the different statutory regulations applicable to the 
employment relationship, Italian law, as many other continental laws, provides for a 
unitary notion of employee, i.e. “who engaged himself to cooperate for remuneration in 
an enterprise by working manually or intellectually under the direction of the 
entrepreneur”31. The identification of the characters of the employee’s subordination – 
as opposite to the self-employed worker’s autonomy – has always been an evergreen 
topic, accompanying the development of Italian labour law from its very beginning to the 
challenges brought by technological innovation32.  
The reflections developed by case law and administrative authorities on the 
qualification of the status of pony expresses and of call center workers represented an 
important step in the elaboration of the criteria able to identify employment relationships. 
Today, the reasoning developed in those cases looks like the most persuasive argument 
for whoever would have to defend before a court the self-employment status of digital 
workers. 
                                                          
25 Trib. Milano 25 May 2015 and Trib. Milano 2 July 2015, both in Diritto dell’informazione e 
dell’informatica, 2015, 6, at p. 1053 and 1068 respectively. 
26 G. MOSCA, Lo sciopero contro Foodora è il sogno infranto della sharing economy, in Wired.it, 11 
October 2016. 
27 N. 1174, 7/13 October 2016, p. 44, translating S. O’CONNOR, When your boss is an algorithm, in ft.com, 
8 September 2016. 
28 F. SAVELLI, «Quattro euro a consegna, contributi e assicurazione infortuni: vi spieghiamo perché 
paghiamo così», in Corriere.it, 4 November 2016. 
29 As provided also by ILO Recommendation concerning the employment relationship n. 198/2006, part. II, 
clause 13, which gives relevance to “the fact that the work is carried out according to the instructions and 
under the control of another party”. 
30 TULLINI, C’è lavoro sul web?, cit., p. 11. 
31 As translated by T. TREU, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Italy, 2nd edition, Kluwer Law 
International, 2007, p. 35. 
32 O. RAZZOLINI, La nozione di subordinazione alla prova delle nuove tecnologie, in DRI, 2014, n. 4, p. 
974. 
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2.1.1. From ponies to kangaroos 
If you just change his walky-talky with a smartphone, a pony express from the 
roaring 80s presents many similarities with those forms of “work on demand via apps” 
that provide delivering services (such as Deliveroo, Foodora and JustEat, whose drivers 
you can easily spot in many Italian city streets)33. 
A significant litigation accompanied the development of the pony express 
business model, together with an animated doctrinal debate34. Several first instance 
judges acknowledged the existence of employment relationships, in labour proceedings 
promoted by the worker35 or by the Social Security Authority (INPS) 36 as well as in 
criminal trials37. Such decisions represented the attempt to interpret the legal notion of 
employee as an open reference “to the economic and social reality in its variety and 
historical dynamicity”38. Emphasising the economic dependency of the worker, his 
insertion into an entrepreneurial organisation, the degree of control exercised by the 
company and the continuity of the performance, those decisions deemed irrelevant the 
allegation that workers were free to accept or refuse the single tasks assigned, rejecting 
the companies’ main defence. The reasoning made more than thirty years ago that “it is 
not realistic to sustain that messengers are free to accept or decline the single task. […] 
once he chooses to work to gain money, the messenger is actually forced to answer the 
call to perform the delivery”39, resembles some of the considerations made by Common 
Law judges in the Uber proceedings40. 
Higher courts, however, did not embrace this interpretative option and overruled 
the first instance decisions, individuating precisely in the freedom to refuse tasks the main 
element excluding the existence of a tie of subordination41. The fact that in many cases 
the pony express carried out the activity continuously was deemed irrelevant, supported 
                                                          
33 D. DI VICO, Foodora, Deliveroo e Just Eat: la vita da pony express hi-tech, corriere.it 15 October 2016. 
34 L. DE ANGELIS, I pony express tra subordinazione e autonomia, in G.G. DEODATO, E. SINISCALCHI, 
Autonomia e subordinazione nelle nuove figure professionali del terziario, Milano 1988, p. 57; A.M. 
CHIESI, Il tempo del lavoro nel settore della consegna immediata, in IRES/Papers, Collana ricerche n. 10, 
Milano 1986.  
35 Pret. Milano 20 June 1986, in RIDL, 1987, II, p. 70, critically commented by ICHINO, and in OGL, 1986, 
II, p. 983, critically commented by SPAGNUOLO VIGORITA. 
36 Pret. Milano 7 October 1988, in FI, 1989, II, c. 2908; Pret. Torino 12 February 1996, in RIDL, 1997, II, 
p. 290, commented by ZANOTELLI. 
37 Pret. Pen. Milano 27 April 1987, in L80, 1987, P. 258, commented by CHIUSOLO. 
38 Pret. Milano 20 June 1986, cit., p. 71. 
39 Ivi, p. 73 f. Therefore the judgement concludes that  “to sustain that they are self-employed workers … 
would mean to misrepresent the legal relevance of their work through a formal-only use of the traditional 
criteria, but also a socially and historically wrong evaluation” (p. 75). 
40 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., considered irrelevant the fact that Uber drivers “are never under 
any obligation to switch on the App or, even if logged on, to accept any driving assignment” (n. 85). Also 
according to O’Connor et. al. v. Uber Technologies Inc. et al., Order denying defendant’s motion for 
summary judgement (California Northern District 11 March 2015), p. 7, “the fact that a certain amount of 
freedom is allowed or is inherent in the nature of the work involved does not preclude a finding of 
employment status”. 
41 At first by second instance judges (Trib. Milano 10 October 1987, in FI, 1989, I, c. 2632), and then by 
the Supreme Court (Cass. 10 July 1991, n. 7608, in RIDL, 1992, II, p. 370, commented by VIGANÒ, and in 
RGL 1992, II, p. 505, commented by CHIACCHIERONI. 
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by those Authors pointing out that the employment status finds its reason in a legal-only 
notion of continuity, i.e. in the “legitimate expectation of the creditor on the continuity of 
the performance according to a program agreed in advance”42. 
Since higher courts continue to uphold this orientation43, it seems very difficult 
for the many digital workers occupied in the sector of transportation and delivering 
services to achieve the judicial ascertainment of the employee status under Italian law. 
2.1.2. When your cubicle is at home 
Call centers were at the centre of literature’s reflections in the first decade of this 
century44. As they gave rise to the most massive concentration of allegedly self-employed 
workers in a particular economic sector45, call centers became emblematic of the 
condition of precariousness of many Italian workers, deserving also a role in popular 
culture and cinema46. 
Some of the outcomes reached by legal literature, case law and public authorities 
should be taken into consideration when it comes to the qualification of crowdworkers, 
i.e. those digital workers who do not only meet their tasks but also perform them online, 
constituting a global virtual workforce47. 
In fact, there is not that much difference between the human intelligence tasks 
crowdsourced through Amazon Mechanical Turk and other crowdsourcing platforms and 
some of the tasks performed in call centers. In both cases, we are mostly before labour 
intensive activities involving the execution of monotone and repetitive “microtasks” that 
do not require particular skills. 
Also due to the political relevance of the problem of repressing misguided 
employment relationships, during the center-left Prodi Government (2006-2008) and the 
center-right Berlusconi government (2008-2011) the Italian Ministry of Labour 
repeatedly issued interpretative criteria to determine the conditions under which it is 
possible to work in a call center under a self-employment relationship. 
A 2006 circular addressed to labour inspectors48 clarified that only call center 
workers who perform in bound activities – i.e. who undertake to answer to incoming calls 
– shall be always deemed as employees. With reference to out bound workers – i.e. those 
who undertake a campaigning project consisting in making a certain amount of calls – the 
circular stated that it is possible to qualify the relationship as a self-employed one insofar 
as the worker is free “a) to decide whether to perform the activity and when; b) to schedule 
                                                          
42 P. ICHINO, Libertà formale e libertà materiale del lavoratore nella qualificazione della prestazione come 
autonoma o subordinata, in RIDL, 1987, II, p. 80. 
43 Cass. 20 January 2011, n. 1238, in GCM, 2011, n. 1, p. 85. 
44  M. MARAZZA, Il mercato del lavoro dopo il caso Atesia. Percorsi alternativi di rientro dalla precarietà, 
in ADL, 2007, 2, 327; V. DI BELLA, Call center e co.co.pro, in DPL, 2007, p. 1459; A. MARESCA & L. 
CAROLLO, Il contratto di collaborazione a progetto nel settore call center, in DRI, 2007, 3, p. 675. 
45 MARAZZA, Il mercato del lavoro, cit., p. 329. 
46 Some movies marked that turn point, such as Tutta la vita davanti (2008) and Generazione 1000 Euro 
(2009). 
47 DAGNINO, Il lavoro nella on-demand economy, cit., p. 90. 
48 Ministry of Labour Circular 14 June 2006, n. 17. 
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the daily working time; c) to suspend the execution of the performance”49. In this case, 
safe for forms of coordination with the client, the out bound worker can determine 
autonomously his working schedule and therefore falls beyond the scope of the employee 
notion. Although the Ministry is not a Legislator and was just addressing labour 
inspectors, the document had a significant impact also on case law, with some decisions 
deeming as self-employed out bound workers50 and other decisions emphasising the non-
binding nature of the ministerial document51. 
Conscious of the difficulties in applying the criterion based on the distinction 
between in bound and out bound activities, the Ministry issued in 200852 a second circular 
which narrowed the scope of self-employed work in call centers, individuating a series of 
factors which would entail reclassification of out bound self-employed workers53. The 
successive center-right government, however, clarified that such sort of presumption of 
the existence of an employment relationship contrasted with the discipline of self-
employed project-related work provided for by legislative decree 276/2003, and with the 
Supreme Court jurisprudence54.  
Also adopting the narrowest approach promoted by the first document, however, 
the subjection to the direction of the employer also with regard to the definition of the 
working period still represents an element that is necessary to claim successfully the 
employment status. 
In light of these principles, it would be even more difficult in most cases to classify 
as employees, under Italian law, those workers who perform their activity on 
crowdsourcing platforms. Not only they are free – like the out bound call centers workers 
– to determine their working schedule in terms of time, but they also retain “the freedom 
to choose when and where to work, how long to spend, and what work to perform”55. In 
addition, the fact that they perform their activity from their own homes, or from any place 
where a wi-fi connection is available – thus without any physical relationship in the 
workplace – would constitute a further element that an Italian judge may valorise in order 
to deny reclassification. 
2.2. Quasi-subordinate self-employed workers? 
Pony express and call center case law witnesses that – despite the attempts to 
valorise the economic and social weakness of the worker – Italian labour law developed 
                                                          
49 Ivi, p. 4. Critical M. ROCCELLA, Manuale di diritto del lavoro, Giappichelli, Torino 2010, p. 60, who 
considered artificial and unable to contrast misclassification the distinction between in bound and out bound 
workers. 
50 Trib. Roma 3 December 2008, in DPL, 2009, p. 1887. 
51 Trib. Milano 18 January 2007, in DPL, 2007, p. 1264. 
52 Ministry of Labour Circular 31 March 2008, n. 8. 
53 Such as: a) the lack of the determination of the specific promotional campaign assigned to the worker; b) 
the assignment of also in bound activities, even though partially; c) the determination by the call center of 
the working time; d) the impossibility, due to the informatics devices used by the worker, to freely schedule 
working time; e) the impossibility for the worker to interrupt the performance through a “break” command; 
f) the exercise of directive and disciplinary power by the call center company. 
54 Ministerial Note 3 December 2008, n. 17286. 
55 FELSTINER, Working the crowd, cit., p. 154. 
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a legal-only notion of subordination, meant as the provision of a personal effort, in terms 
of time and energies, to the employer and subject to his direction56. Even though judges 
would evaluate the circumstance of the effective and stable introduction of the worker in 
the firm’s organisation and a series of secondary criteria, the autonomy of the worker with 
respect to time scheduling, choice of tasks and working place appears to be de iure 
condito an unsurmountable obstacle to reclassification in terms of an employment 
relationship. 
It is also hard to assimilate properly digital workers to the category of quasi-
subordinate workers developed in Italy, German and Spain, as some common law area 
scholars suggested57. In general, the notion of “economic dependency” postulates that the 
worker devotes the main part of his activity to a single client58, while in the case of digital 
work, as it has been noted, there is often no stable counterparty to burden with duties and 
responsibilities59. 
The scope of the Italian definition of quasi-subordinate workers includes those 
workers who, without any tie of subordination, provide continuously a mostly personal 
activity under the coordination of the counterpart of the contract (art. 409 civil procedure 
code., as emended in 1973 for the purpose of the extension of a few employment 
warranties to quasi-subordinate workers). Even though coordinated and continuous 
collaborations are treated as self-employed relationships, some particular rules are set 
with regard to social security contributions, which are set for 2/3 on the client. The recent 
reform of Italian labour law known as Jobs Act abrogated the discipline on project-related 
work (art. 61-69.bis), that was applicable to quasi-subordinate workers. Such abrogation, 
together with the parallel re-conduction to the field of employment of so called heter-
organised relationships60, has been waved by the government as the elimination a 
precarious and unpopular working form61 .  
However, it is to say that, on one hand, the last measure may not in fact contain 
any real innovation62. On the other hand, what has been eliminated is not the possibility 
to recur to quasi-subordinate work but just the few warranties that had been introduced to 
                                                          
56 The father of Italian labour law, Ludovico Barassi, sustained such a legal-only notion of subordination 
in the first decades of the XX century (L. BARASSI, Il contratto di lavoro nel diritto positive italiano, Società 
Editrice Libraria, Milano 1915, p. 6 f.). 
57 S.D. HARRIS & A.B. KRUEGER, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: 
The "Independent Worker", The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2015-10, December 2015. 
58 A. PERULLI, Un Jobs Act per il lavoro autonomo: verso una nuova disciplina della dipendenza 
economica?, in CSDLE, It, 235/2015, p. 16. 
59 M. FORLIVESI, La sfida della rappresentanza sindacale dei lavoratori 2.0, in DRI, 2016, n. 3, p. 666. 
60 Those relationships involving the execution of a performance that is organised by the counterpart also 
with respect to the time and the place of the execution (art. 2, d.lgs. 81/2015). 
61 In an interview Prime Minister Renzi proudly claimed the intention to eliminate coordinated and 
continuous collaborations, project-related work “and all that kind of stuff” (La Repubblica, 30 November 
2014). 
62 O. MAZZOTTA, Lo strano caso delle collaborazioni organizzate dal committente, in Labor, 2016, 1/2, p. 
7, who notes that the criterion of temporal and spatial heter-organisation was already used by courts to 
distinguish employment relationships from self-employed ones, even when “quasi-subordinate”. 
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avoid its abusive recourse (such as the duty to indicate the specific “project” for which 
the contract is stipulated, under penalty of reclassification). 
Anyways, if we consider the counterpart of the self-employed digital worker to be 
the several clients that he may happen to serve, it would be quite difficult to conclude that 
such activity, which is certainly personal, is characterised by the elements of continuity 
and coordination. The terms and conditions of some platforms appear to foresee the risks 
for a single client to repeatedly receive services from a same worker63, and decline any 
responsibility for the case that such continuous recourse entails the constitution of an 
employment relationship under applicable legislation64. 
If we evaluate the existence of the elements of continuity and coordination with 
reference to the relationship between the worker and the platform, however, we could 
easily conclude that in many cases there is a quasi-subordinate relationship falling within 
the scope of art. 409 n. 3 c.p.c. 
In Italy, some platforms have qualified their relationship with workers as a 
coordinated and continuous collaborations (it is the case of the Foodora delivering 
platform), and yet the platform was still able to pay fees which were far under minimum 
wage, allowing workers to earn something like three euros per hour. Therefore, even 
when it is possible to deem as quasi-subordinate the workers that continuously work on 
the same platforms, the qualification in terms of quasi-subordinate workers is not per se 
sufficient to guarantee further protection to those digital workers who would not be able 
to reach reclassification. Quasi-subordinate work, conclusively, should not indeed be 
considered a sort of panacea65. 
2.3. Self-employed workers, unfortunately 
The considerations just developed on the qualification of digital workers’ legal 
status under Italian law suggest that even though the language used in the terms and 
conditions set by platforms may be seen as “twisted language … [that] merits, we think, 
a degree of scepticism”66, the claim that platforms are not parties of any employment 
relationships is not that easy to undermine. Even outside Italian law and its narrow notion 
of employee, the qualification in terms of self-employment laid down in the platforms’ 
terms and conditions appears convincing de iure condito67, although the often-
unsustainable consequences of such qualification (with reference to working conditions 
and occupational stability) may suggest the opportunity to deem the platforms as 
employers or at least joint employers.  
                                                          
63 AMT Participation Agreement, § 3: “You acknowledge that, while Providers are agreeing to perform 
Services for you as independent contractors and not employees, repeated and frequent performance of 
Services by the same Provider on your behalf could result in reclassification of that employment status”. 
64 Taskrabbit Terms of Service, § 12. 
65 De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time-Workforce”, cit., p. 497. 
66 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 87. 
67 BERGVALL-KÅREBORN & HOWCROFT, Amazon Mechanical Turk, cit., p. 218; DE STEFANO, The Rise of 
the “Just-in-Time-Workforce”, cit., p. 478; DAGNINO, Il lavoro nella on-demand economy, cit., p. 91. 
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The conclusion that the examined digital workers are in most cases self-employed 
contractors does not derive from an overvaluation of the contractual label (nomen iuris), 
which is substantially irrelevant. Such a qualification, instead, is strongly suggested by 
the circumstance that – safe for pathological cases – they are not actually bound to the 
directive power of any employer as long as they truly retain the freedom to choose when 
and where to work, how long to spend, and what work to perform. 
It is a conclusion that is coherent also with European law, which does not impose 
any wider qualification criterion (although there is no EU competence on the qualification 
of employment relationships). In fact, the European Court of Justice individuated the 
essence of subordination in the circumstance that the worker “acts under the direction of 
his employer as regards, in particular, his freedom to choose the time, the place and the 
object of his work”68. 
The “freedom” of the worker and the presence of a plurality of users suggest that 
the legal framework of digital work could be the triangular scheme of “self-employed 
work intermediation”, constituted by three contracts: one self-employment contract 
between the worker and the user, and two intermediation contracts stipulated by the 
platform with the worker and the user. 
The following paragraphs will try to analyse the relationships involved in the 
triangular scheme proposed by the platforms themselves, in order to verify whether – 
when reclassification would not be accepted by a judge – the rules governing the specific 
relationships, as well as those applicable by virtue of the contractual integration between 
them, may prevent digital workers to fall within an “empty space of law”. 
2.4. Mere intermediary or party to the self-employment contract? 
If there is a self-employment relationship, we should first ask ourselves who the 
counterpart of the worker in such relationship is. If we accept the reconstruction operated 
by the platform, we should say that it is only the time-per-time user, and that therefore 
not even who works eight hours per day via the same platform can be considered someone 
“continuously serving a same main client”. 
While we have seen that the qualification in terms of self-employment laid down 
by the platforms appeared convincing (safe for pathological cases), the claim that they 
just intermediate the provision of transportation services by the users seems more 
artificial, almost absurd69. About Ubers’ activity, labour judges have noted that “Uber 
does not simply sell software; it sells rides. Uber is no more a “technological company” 
than Yellow Cab is a ‘technology company’ because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi 
cabs”70 and that it is “unreal to deny that Uber is in business as a supplier of 
transportation services. Simple common sense argues to the contrary”71 . Also 
                                                          
68 ECJ 2 December 2014, C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden, in 
European Competition Law Review, 2015, p. 181, commented by BABIRAD, and in RIDL, 2015, II, p. 566, 
commented by ICHINO. 
69 WEISS, Digitalizzazione, cit., p. 656. 
70 O’Connor et al. v. Uber Technologies Inc. et al., p. 10. 
71 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 89. 
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competition law judges held the platform responsible for carrying a transportation 
service72, and a Barcelona judge requested for an ECJ’s preliminary ruling on the question 
of the nature of the activity carried out by Uber73. 
The same functional approach proposed to individuate in the platforms the 
employer or one of the employers of the digital worker74 could be useful also in the 
different perspective of the individuation of the counterpart of the self-employement 
relationship. 
The platform acts indeed as a “cumbersome middleman”75 and the intermediation 
contracts are both deeply connected with the self-employment contract. The 
intermediation contract sets in fact the frame within which several self-employment 
contracts are stipulated by the worker and a plurality of clients. Platforms do not only 
intermediate service, they provide services to users by connecting them to the workers 
who would actually perform the required activity following the indications set by the 
platforms themselves.  
As they do intermediate, they will respond for the obligations deriving from the 
intermediation contracts they subscribe with the users and the workers. The mediation 
contract is also a contractual type regulated by dispositive provisions of the Italian civil 
code (art. 1754 and ff.). The user-platform relationship shall meet the requirements set 
forth by consumer law when the user is a physical person, acting for non-entrepreneurial 
purposes, and even with regard to the worker-platform intermediation contract it would 
not be out of place to think about the application of consumers protection against 
vexatious clauses, emphasising the circumstance that the worker acts as a “prosumer”76. 
However, as platforms set also the rules governing the self-employment 
relationship, they do also become a party to that relationship or, at the very least, they 
should still be held responsible for those breaches of the self-employment contract to 
which they participated, even when the input comes from the user. 
In this perspective, we may find in the worker-platform relationship the character 
of continuity that misses with regard to the relationship between the worker and the user 
(entailing the application of quasi-subordinate discipline). In addition, even the most 
occasional worker may enforce against the platform the rights deriving from the self-
employment relationship.  
But what rights are we talking about? 
                                                          
72 Trib. Milano 2 July 2015, cit., p. 1076, where the judge underlines as “it seems in fact possible to 
assimilate completely the intermediation activity to the taxi services [as] the conduct of the Company 
results certainly inextricably connected to the activity performed by the single drivers who violate the 
discipline governing the provision of taxi services”.  
73 Request for a preliminary ruling 7 August 2015, C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber 
Systems Spain, S.L. The decision of the Luxembourg Court, which may have relevant consequences also 
for labour lawyer, as it could state that they run – for any effect – a transportation business, should arrive 
in the spring of 2017. 
74 PRASSL & RISAK, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co., cit., p. 635 f. 
75 A. DONINI, Il lavoro digitale su piattaforma, in Labour Law Issues, 2015, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 59; S.C. MOATTI, 
The Sharing Economy’s New Middlemen, in hbr.org, 5 March 2015. 
76 ALOISI, Commoditized workers, cit., p. 664 f. 
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3. Self-employed work rights and their sources 
In Italy, as in most civil law countries, the discipline of self-employed work 
contracts is quite gaunt (only seven articles in the civil code, art. 2222 to 2228) and 
construes the notion of the self-employed worker in negative, by stressing the lack of 
subordination. Labour lawyers, with some exceptions77, have not often focused on such 
discipline, as they have limited the analysis to the problem of qualification78. 
The challenge of digital work, however, could be an opportunity to develop a new 
perspective on the protection of self-employed personal work. It does not seem a 
coincidence that the recent Italian Bill 2233 (infra, § 3.2) contains in the same text 
provisions on “autonomous non-entrepreneurial work” (first part) and employment 
provisions “promoting flexibility with reference to the working time and place” (second 
part). The structure of the bill itself thus confirms that the digitalisation of labour – of 
standards types and of new forms of labour – requires action on different frontlines. 
Moreover, European contract law has indeed developed in the last decades a 
human dimension in regulating contracts characterised by the imbalance of the parties79, 
on the ground of the interpretative evaluation of the general clause of good faith80 as well 
as because of the legislative intervention in the field of consumer law and B2b contracts81. 
In this perspective, it has been underlined that contract law represents nowadays – perhaps 
even more than labour law itself – “a fruitful field for the ethical evaluation of 
entrepreneurial behaviours”82. 
With respect to that apparent “empty space of law” represented by the condition 
of self-employed digital workers, it is important to stress out that some rules would still 
apply. Contract law general principles (such as the principle of good faith and 
correctness), would find full application, prohibiting those behaviours that result in the 
abusive exercise of the rights descending from the contract83.  
                                                          
77 A. PERULLI, Il lavoro autonomo. Contratto d’opera e professioni intellettuali, Giuffrè, Milano 1996. 
78 M.T. CARINCI, Il contratto d’opera, in G. GITTI, M. MAUGERI, M. NOTARI (Eds.), I contratti per 
l’impresa, Il Mulino, Bologna 2012, p. 176. 
79 L. NOGLER & U. REIFNER, Life Time Contracts: Social Long-term Contracts in Labour, Tenancy and 
Consumer Credit Law, Eleven International Publishing 2014. 
80 F. DENOZZA, Il lavoro nell’impresa neo-liberale, in M.T. CARINCI (Ed.), Dall'impresa a rete alle reti 
d'impresa. Scelte organizzative e diritto del lavoro, Giuffrè, Milano 2015, p. 75, insisting on the utility of 
general clauses as applicable to every field of private law. 
81 I.e. those contractual relationships between a strong main firm and a series of small or micro-businesses 
who depending on the former. G. GITTI & G. VILLA, Il terzo contratto. L’abuso di potere contrattuale nei 
rapporti tra imprese, Il Mulino, Bologna 2008; E. LABELLA, Tutela della microimpresa e “terzo contratto”, 
in EDP, 2015, n. 4, p. 857. 
82 A. PERULLI, Il controllo giudiziale dei poteri dell’imprenditore tra evoluzione legislativa e diritto vivente, 
in RIDL, 2015, I, n. 1, p. 83. 
83 U. MORELLO, Abuso del diritto: la difficile via della concretizzazione, in A. GAMBARO & U. MORELLO 
(Eds.), Lezioni di diritto civile, Giuffrè, Milano 2013, p. 685, the reference is in particular to the principles 
stated in the famous Renault Case, where the Italian Supreme Court (Cass. 18 September 2009, n. 20106, 
in I contratti 2010, p. 5) deemed abusive the sudden and unjustified termination of a franchise relationship 
between Renault and a small agent condemning the French Company to reparation for damage and loss. 
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On another hand, it will be appropriate to consider the application of the discipline 
of B2b contracts, and in particular of art. 9, law 192/1998, which prohibits the “abuse of 
economic dependency” 84 of a small firm towards a main client. Although such provision 
is contained in a Law regulating the “sub-supply” commercial relationships, the Italian 
Supreme Court clarified that article 9 has a wider scope than the other provisions of that 
Law, as it constitutes a “general clause”, applicable to any contractual relationship in 
which an abuse of economic dependence may occur85. On this ground, it seems reasonable 
to extend the application of the prohibition of the abuse of economic dependency to self-
employment relationships, in order to protect, at the very least, autonomous workers from 
suffering unilaterally and arbitrary decisions made by their counterpart86. 
The combination of the few civil code provisions regarding self-employment, 
together with the general principles of contract law and the extensive interpretation of the 
B2b contracts rules, may result in a discipline able to provide some protection against 
some of the critical issues raised by platform-mediated work, as the following paragraphs 
will try to show. 
3.1. Some consequences under private law 
Most platforms retain the power to exclude the worker from the use of the 
platform, deactivating his account. If we consider digital workers as employees such 
deactivation may be deemed as a dismissal, and would therefore need to comply with 
national and European provisions requiring the dismissal to be justified87. Self-employed 
workers, instead, do not enjoy the same warranties. The relevance of the problem of 
“deactivation power” emerges if only we take into account the circumstance that one of 
the conditions contained in the Cotter v. Lyft settlement proposal provided for the 
enforcement of a grievance process heard by an arbitrator to be undertaken before account 
deactivation88.  
Deactivation, actually, does look more like the termination of the intermediation 
contract than like the termination of the self-employment relationship that is framed 
within it. In this perspective, the specific provision about the termination of the self-
employment contract provided for by art. 2227 of the Civil Code, providing for the right 
to terminate at will the relationship by paying the worker a compensation, does not seem 
any useful. If we consider deactivation as the termination of the intermediation frame, on 
the contrary, we could usefully recur to contract law general principles and B2b contracts 
regulations to syndicate its legitimacy. 
                                                          
84 Economic dependency is defined as “the situation allowing a firm to determine, in its commercial 
relationship with another firm, an excessive imbalance of rights and duties”. 
85 Cass. S.U. 25 November 2011, n. 24906, in Foro italiano 2012, 3, I, 805. 
86 D. DEL BIONDO, L’abuso di dipendenza economica nei confronti dei lavoratori autonomi, in M.T. 
CARINCI (Ed.), Dall'impresa a rete alle reti d'impresa, cit., p. 423. 
87 As art. 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union clearly states, “every worker has 
the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Community law and national laws 
and practices”.  
88 CHERRY, Beyond Misclassification, cit., p. 583. The provision of a due process before deactivation 
resembles closely the protective schemes adopted against dismissal. 
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Two decisions from Southern Italy regarding the famous online auction and 
shopping website Ebay may represent a good example. Both decisions, rendered in the 
contest of the special “urgency” proceeding provided for by art. 700 c.p.c., ordered the 
Company to re-activate the accounts of two sellers who had been de-activated due to low 
feedbacks.  
The first decision89 deemed unlawful the deactivation under the general rules on 
contract termination set forth by the civil code (art. 1454 and ff.), considering the mere 
presence of low feedbacks not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a serious breach 
of the contract. The judge considered that a clause allowing resolution only due to low 
feedbacks would be a vexatious clause requiring double subscription (missing in the case) 
for its enforceability90. However, it has been noted that even in presence of a second 
subscription, the clause would still be void under art. 9 L. 192/1998, as it realises “an 
abusive imposition of unjustifiably vexatious conditions”91. 
The second decision92 seems more aware of the social and economic dimension 
of the problem and gave relevance to the oligopolistic structure of Ebay’s on-line 
marketplace. The judge recognised the existence of the so called periculum in mora 
(necessary to access to the urgency proceeding) because “the exclusion from Ebay does 
not only produce some lost clients, but excludes a micro-business from the market 
itself”93. However, the judgement explicitly excluded the application of consumer 
protection law and of Law 1992/1998, on the ground that there was no “introduction of 
the micro-business in the productive process of a main client”94. 
What is interesting about the two aforementioned decisions is that, even if they 
move within the field of general contract law, they are still able to grant the weak party 
of the relationship with a real protection, a sort of reinstatement, reaching an effect that 
reminds the traditional sanction against unjustified dismissal.  
Many of the considerations developed by the aforementioned decisions can deal 
with the reputational systems adopted by some platforms. With regard to digital workers, 
it would be easier to invoke the invalidity under art. 9 Law 192/1998 of vexatious clauses 
granting termination at will powers to the counterpart, as there is nothing ancillary to the 
platforms business in their activity95. In this perspective, it is possible to give a partial 
                                                          
89 Trib. Messina 7 July 2010, in Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica, 2011, p. 118, commented by 
CIMINO. 
90 Art. 1341 (2) of the civil code provides a list of clauses that require double subscription if they are 
contained in general terms and conditions set by one party without negotiation, as the clause allowing that 
party to freely terminate the contract.  
91 I.P. CIMINO, Sospensione dell'account di vendita nel marketplace di ebay, tutela del contratto e della 
libertà di impresa nel commercio elettronico, in Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica, 2011, p. 132 
f., who notes that “unjustifiably vexatious conditions” in B2b relationships are mainly those allowing the 
strong party to unilaterally modify the rules governing the contract and to terminate it without notice. 
92 Trib. Catanzaro 30 April 2012, in Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica, 2012, p. 1174, commented 
by ARANGUENA. 
93 Ivi, p. 1180. 
94 Ivi, p. 1176.  
95 As the Employment Judge noticed in Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 95. 
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answer to the question is account deactivation a new form of dismissal?96 The answer is 
still open, but in any case even without applying dismissal discipline it is possible to 
prevent the unjustified exclusions of workers from the platforms. Low ratings can bring 
to deactivation only if they derive from a seriously neglect conduct of the worker and in 
any case a minimal procedure to allow the worker to defend himself shall be accorded. 
The issue is strictly connected with the problem of the control that the platform is 
capable to exercise on the execution of the performance, even by delegating it to users97. 
Such control, in fact, is compatible with the self-employed nature of the relationship as 
long as it remains a control on the result of the work – in order to guarantee minimum 
standards of quality and safety – and not on the execution of the worker’s performance. 
Coherent with the alleged self-employment status, personal ratings should not depend on 
the amount of time the worker devotes to the tasks delivered via app. 
Should the reputational system “punish” dormant workers, they would be able to 
react invoking an employee status, as they would end up to be at the disposal of an 
employer (as Judge Snelson noticed, quoting Milton, “they also serve who only stand and 
wait”98). Nevertheless, at the same time, they would also have the possibility to invoke 
their self-employment status in order to prevent the platform from affecting their rate or 
to “dismiss” them without a concrete reasonable cause. Although it is clear that the 
acknowledgement of an employment status would bring much more benefits, it may also 
be useful to provide the worker with a “second bullet”, in a context characterised by 
uncertainty and by the malleability of employment tests99. 
Although the case of the termination of the contract through account deactivation 
seems paradigmatic, a similar approach could be adopted to ascertain the legitimacy of 
the clauses allowing the user to refuse the acceptance of a performed task, without 
providing payment to the worker100, as well as to question the legitimacy of the 
exclusivity clause that some platforms insert in their general conditions101.  
In the first case special provisions on self-employed work regarding the right to 
receive due compensation may apply. Art. 2227 of the civil code provides the client with 
the right to terminate the self-employment relationship when the task has been partially 
executed, “compensating the worker for the expenses, for the performed work and for his 
loss”. Case law stated that the “loss” under art. 2227 c.c. is constituted by the full price 
of the agreed performance102. The special provision on self-employed “intellectual 
performances” (art. 2237 c.c.) provides the worker with the right to be compensated for 
the expenses and to be paid for the performed work, which will be quantified “with regard 
                                                          
96 ALOISI, Commoditized workers, cit., p. 674. 
97 A. ROSENBLAT & L. STARK, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s 
Drivers, in International Journal of Communication, 2016, 10, 3758; PRASSL & RISAK, Uber, Taskrabbit 
& Co., cit., p. 626. 
98 Aslam, Farrar et al. v. Uber B.V. et al., n. 100. 
99 CHERRY, Beyond Misclassification, cit., p. 582. 
100 AMT Participation Agreement, § 3. 
101 DE STEFANO, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time-Workforce”, cit., p. 488, referring to AMT’s and Topcoder’s 
terms and conditions. 
102 Among the most recent decisions, Trib. Monza, 12 January 2016, in De Jure. 
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to the utility deriving to the client”. Under both these regulations, which prohibit 
termination without compensation when the performance is not yet completed, it seems 
that the clause allowing the client to refuse a completed task should be a fortiori not 
enforceable under Italian law. 
Even the exclusivity clauses may be deemed unlawful under Italian law. In the 
first place, as they result in “restrictions to the freedom to contract with third parties” they 
certainly require double subscription under art. 1341 c.c.103. In the second place, it could 
be appropriate to consider such clause as vexatious under B2b statutes, and thus void 
under art. 9 L. 128/1998, adopting the same reasoning proposed with regard to the 
remedies against account deactivation. 
It seems therefore possible to address some crucial issues regarding the protection 
of digital workers also through the application of non-employment regulations: the 
general rules of contract law, the specific rules on self-employment and the regulations 
regarding B2b contractual relationships. However, the recourse to civil law principles and 
regulations is still far from being a satisfactory solution, as it presents all the weaknesses 
of an interpretative-only solution and leaves unsolved many critical points. 
3.2. Towards the development of a Statute for self-employed (digital) workers 
An answer to the absence of an exhaustive discipline on pure self-employed work 
comes from the recent Italian Bill 2233 (pending in the Chamber of Deputies104) 
containing “protective provisions on self-employed non-entrepreneurial work”. 
As it has been underlined, the legislator tried for the first time to construe a 
discipline of self-employed work based on the acknowledgement of its social and ethical 
value, rather than on the prejudice that it hides actual employment relationships105. 
The Bill introduces several warranties for self-employed workers, ranging from 
the protection against payment delays (art. 2), to tax benefits (art. 7 and 8), to the access 
to formation and collocation services (art. 9) and public procurement (art. 11), to social 
security benefits such as (unpaid) maternity leave, sick leave and injury leave (art. 12 and 
13). 
In the perspective of digital self-employed work, one of the most important 
provisions is set up by art. 3, which explicitly provides for the application to self-
employment relationships of the aforementioned art. 9 L. 192/1998, thus removing the 
uncertainties of interpretative extension. In addition, art. 3 specifies that the clauses 
“granting the client the power to unilaterally modify terms and conditions and, where the 
self-employment relationship is characterised by continuity, to terminate the relationship 
without notice” are vexatious and thus void. 
                                                          
103 Supra, n. 90. 
104 The bill was approved by the Senate and transmitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 3 November 2016. 
105 O. RAZZOLINI, Il ddl sul lavoro autonomo: dalla tutela della dipendenza alla tutela della persona, in 
nelmerito.com, 6 may 2016; S. GIUBBONI, Prime osservazioni sul disegno di legge del Governo in materia 
di lavoro autonomo non imprenditoriale, in Massimario di giurisprudenza del lavoro, 2016, n. 4, p. 244. 
Even the relation to the Bill by Senator Sacconi remarks this change of perspective. 
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It is not clear whether the invalidity of the vexatious clause would lead to real 
remedies (such as the re-constitution of the relationship or the disapplication of the 
clause), as the Bill provides that the worker would be entitled to receive reparation for 
damage and loss (art. 3 (3)). However, it seems possible to interpret such provision as 
granting reparation for the damage and loss related to the enforcement of the vexatious 
clause, without excluding the possibility of the restoration of the status quo ante at the 
request of the worker. 
A more specific attempt to regulate the provision of personal services in the gig-
economy is represented by the Bill 3564 containing “provisions on digital platforms for 
the sharing of goods and services and provisions promoting sharing economy” (so called 
Sharing Economy Act)106. Although the Bill reflects somehow the misunderstanding that 
the gig-economy represents an aspect of sharing-economy107, and its purpose is mainly 
to promote sharing economy108 – with an eye to the tax increase that may derive from its 
development109 – the Bill contains some provisions which may be extremely relevant for 
the purpose of granting a fair treatment to platform-mediated workers. 
Art. 4 of the Bill provides that the platform owners shall adopt a written policy, 
subject to the Competition Authority’s approval, including the contractual terms and 
conditions between the platform and its users. The Bill provides for a list of clauses 
penalising the “user-operator” (broad label that seems to include also those that we have 
called “digital workers”), which are expressly sanctioned with invalidity. In particular, 
platforms terms and conditions can not “a) burden the user-operator with any kind of 
exclusive obligation; b) allow the control on the execution of his performance, not even 
through hardware or software systems; c) determine compulsory fees for all users;  d) 
allow the exclusion of the user-operator from the platform or penalise him in the 
presentation of his offer without serious reasons; […] h) forbid the user operator from 
criticising the owner of the platform” (art. 4 (2)). 
Although the Bill is meant to regulate all kinds of sharing economy activities, 
without a specific labour law focus, the provisions that we have just examined – 
promoting transparency and fairness in the platform’s management – should be welcomed 
as they represent a consistent step forward in filling up that “empty space of law” where 
digital workers seemed to fall. 
                                                          
106 Proposed on 27 January 2016 and currently pending in the Chamber of Deputies. 
107 Critics to this reconstruction have been made by many commentators: G.M. ECKHARDT & F. BARDHI, 
The Sharing Economy Isn’t about Sharing at All, in hbr.org 28 Janary 2015; V. MANSHARAMANI, What 
happens when the sharing economy stops sharing and starts owning?, in pbs.org 4 February 2016; A. 
CALLAWAY, Apploitation in a City of Instaserfs: How The "Sharing Economy" Has Turned San Francisco 
into a Dystopia for the 
Working Class, in Monitor, 2016, vo. 22, n. 5, p. 18.  
108 The Relation to the Bill makes reference to D. WOSSKOW, Unlocking the Sharing Economy. An 
Independent Review, report commissioned by the UK Business Ministry and released in November 2014 
and recommending as to how the UK could become a global centre for this fast-growing sector. 
109 The Relation to the Bill foresees the emersion of 450 million Euros of GDP as of today (producing a 
150 million Euros tax revenue, which could raise to 3 billion by 2025. 
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4. Conclusions 
The frustrations raising from the difficulty in applying statutory employment law 
to digital workers110 should not lead to the misunderstanding that no protection can be 
found outside that domain. The lightness of intermediated self-employed work remains 
unbearable, but some attempts to make it heavier may be crowned with success. 
Through the valorisation of contract law principles and regulations we may 
already be able, at an interpretative level, to address some of the issues raised by platform-
mediated self-employed work. The legislative perspective of implementing new sets of 
rules for “pure” self-employed workers and digital “users-operators” may also bring 
further answers to the exigencies of digital workers. 
Some crucial points, however, remain unresolved. Certainly the problem of low 
wages, which cannot be faced by the application of the constitutional principle of 
minimum wage111 or by the provision on quasi-subordinate workers fair wage, abrogated 
by the Jobs Act reform112. But also the risks of self-exploitation and exploitation of child 
labour113 and the difficulties in pursuing effective collective representation for an 
atomised working force114 cannot find a satisfactory solution outside the field of statutory 
employment law. The challenge to avoid digitalisation from bringing to a nosedive labour 
law standards, therefore, calls for a political reflection to be conducted both at national 
and at supranational level. 
 
                                                          
110 WEISS, Digitalizzazione, cit., p. 662. 
111 Case law repeatedly stated the exclusion of self-employed worker from the scope of art. 36 of the 
Constitution, providing the right to “proportionate and adequate salary”, since the Constitutional Court 
decision 7 July 1964, n. 75, in GCost, 1964, p. 751. P. PALAZZO, La prestazione d’opera professionale e 
l’art. 36 della Costituzione, in RTDPC, 1973, p. 1643, underlines the reasoning of the Court that self-
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